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geniuses: like them he has unusual mental endowments, the capacity for making ready use of materials at hand, and he is profoundly saturated with the social consciousness.

Man possesses no innate religious instinct but only capacities which may or may not be developed into religious attitudes. The non-religious individual is recognized as a possibility under the conditions of modern society, i.e., people of various types who do not participate in any definite way in the ideal values of the social consciousness. Religious sects form a transition stage in the development of modern society. They are responses to particular human needs but are all more or less partial, representing partitions in the social consciousness. Society, however, is larger in its needs than any sect and there is a present need of denominations passing beyond these limited historic functions and participating "more fully with scientific awareness and efficiency in the highest ideals of the whole race."

The essential relation between religious aspiration and the ideals of democracy and of science is last of all treated. The author sees in this relation new possibilities of religious development for the future.

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The Mind of Primitive Man. A Course of Lectures Delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston, Mass., and the National University of Mexico, 1910-11. By FRANZ BOAS. New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. x+294. \$1.50 net.

This series of essays presents the author's American colleagues with a convenient summary of his views on the fundamental problems of his science, views that have molded in large measure the development of anthropological thought in this country and have proved one of the greatest stimuli to anthropological research. However, it is precisely for this reason that the foremost service of the work lies in bringing that substantial body of ethnological doctrine before a larger public—before European anthropologists, who still seem strangely unfamiliar with the principal conceptions developed on American soil, and, above all, before that even wider circle of sociologists, historians, philosophers, and what not, who have hitherto been obliged to draw their anthropological data from sources either classical but antiquated, or modern in date but hopelessly out of touch with the recent trend of thought.

Professor Boas' theme in the book before us is the race problem.

The obvious differences in cultural achievement between the white race and other races, coupled with the post-Darwinian tendency to impress all facts whatsoever into the service of evolutionary schemes of development, have led to a gradation of human races, according to their deviations from the white type. The theories that have originated in this way involve the assumption that the possession of a certain type of culture is a function of hereditary mental endowment. In a prefatory chapter Boas points out in an astonishingly convincing way that differences in culture may be due to historical causes that have nothing to do with racial aptitude and become negligible when viewed in proper perspective. Ancient Peru and Central America enjoyed a culture comparable with that of ancient Old World civilization. The difference between Old World civilization and Indian civilization is that the former has had an accelerated development by which it reached a certain stage three or four thousand years sooner. But this difference is of no account as compared with the age of the human species. The respective acceleration or retardation of development is intelligible as the results of chance and of specific historical conditions. If, then, participation in a superior culture is not proof of superior endowment, anatomical deviations from the white norm cannot be regarded as evidence of inferiority without begging the question. As a matter of fact, the European stands in certain zoölogical traits closer to the apes than other races, "while the specifically human development of the red lip is developed most markedly in the Negro" (p. 22). So far as the racial differences in brain weight are concerned, Boas reminds us that the relation between weight and ability is not univocal; thus, the sexual differences within the same race seem to be correlated with differences in quality rather than grade of faculty, and exceptional brain weight is not uniformly coupled with exceptional ability. While thus warning against an overestimation of the correlation between mental faculty and brain development, the author emphatically asserts that some psychological differences must be assumed to be correlated with the anatomical differences, though they may be of a qualitative character. But the variability of the individuals within any one race is so great that no racial differences have hitherto been definitely established, and a comparison of white brains with Negro brains leads to the result that the vast majority of individual members of the two series compared coincide. The Negro race may not produce as many minds of exceptional ability as the white race, but so far as its average performance is concerned Boas arrives at the conclusion that there is no evidence for

believing in a racial inferiority that would unfit an individual Negro to take his part in modern civilization (p. 29; pp. 91 f., 122 f., 272).

Two chapters are devoted to the biological problem of the influence of environment and heredity. Here Boas summarizes his recent investigations on the descendants of immigrants to the United States. In view of newspaper misrepresentation and the recent travesty that is becoming notorious in anthropological circles as "the Radosavljevich lampoon," it may be well to emphasize the fact that the author regards the influence of environment as, comparatively speaking, quite subordinate. "Even granting the greatest possible amount of influence to environment, it is readily seen that all the essential traits of man are due primarily to heredity" (p. 76). The facts discovered by Boas include a change of type in the bodily form (especially the cephalic index) of the American-born descendants of Sicilians and Hebrews in New York City. By a process of exclusion the reason for this change is reduced to the direct influence of environment. Boas does not hold the view erroneously ascribed to him that there is a tendency toward the formation of a single American type, and expressly states that the plasticity discovered must be conceived as strictly limited (pp. 63 f.). Nevertheless, the fact of morphological plasticity is an *a-fortiori* argument for the plasticity of the correlated psychic traits since the development of the mind is prolonged far beyond the period of physical growth. Quite apart from these considerations, Boas traces a most suggestive parallel between the environmental influence of domestication on animals and the effect of the corresponding regulation of the food supply on the human species.

The bulk of the remaining chapters is devoted to the question, whether a correlation exists between race on the one hand and mental and cultural traits on the other. The popular belief that primitive man lacks the faculties of attention, inhibition, originality, and reasoning is refuted and explained at the same time by the demonstration that these faculties are exercised by both primitive and by civilized man, but on different occasions. Similarly, the hoary fallacy that language stands in any close relationship with either race or culture is ruled out of court. The fact that certain languages seem not so well adapted to the expression of abstract thought as others does not prove a lesser power of abstract thinking on the part of the speakers, but rather indicates the lack of necessity for abstract formulation. Thus much has been made of the deficient numeral systems of certain primitive tribes; yet as soon as the necessity for abstract numeral expressions has arisen

under the stress of modern conditions, it has invariably been met by the development of adequate terms. Again, it has been assumed that all cultures form *one* series ascending by gradual stages to the level of our own civilization; and if particular stages were characteristic of particular races it would be plausible to assume that races found on a higher level have advanced with greater rapidity on account of their superior native abilities. However, the theory of a unilinear development of culture is shaken by an unbiased view of the facts. Pottery, one of the current criteria of higher culture, is not found among peoples that from every other point of view must be ranked as very far advanced in the scale. Similarly, the absence of metallurgy, agriculture, and other features does not prevent tribes from otherwise rivaling in complexity of culture, peoples that possess these features. There certainly cannot be established a correlation of race with industrial progress; roughly speaking, a classification of this type would unite the Bushman, Terra del Fuegian, Veddah, and Australian in one group, and the Pueblo Indian, Polynesian, and Central African Negro in another.

Apart from the elucidation of the race question, the chapters just summarized present an amazing wealth of suggestive thoughts on fundamental problems. Thus the categories of language are defined in an unexceptionable manner as the result of what Mach has called "an economy of thought" and what psychologists generally understand by "the synthetic quality of consciousness" (p. 143). An intercalary chapter expounds the theories explaining cultural analogies in different regions, and introduces Boas' view that the geographical environment does not determine culture (pp. 155-73). In the critique of unilinear evolutionary schemes the difficulty of grading remote cultures is convincingly shown by the proof of *convergent* development from distinct sources (pp. 184-93); and an equally suggestive point is made in demonstrating that while that part of culture which has a rationalistic basis develops from the simple to the complex, precisely the reverse is true of several fields of non-rationalistic activity, notably those of language and music (pp. 193-95).

Boas next attempts to formulate the difference between primitive and civilized modes of thought regardless of race. He finds that concepts that we separate are classified together in primitive thought, and vice versa. Thus, primitive man puts in the same category man and movable objects, and may separate the luminosity of the sun (as a distinct object) from the Sun himself. The fact that our systems of classifications are logically superior to those of uncivilized peoples does

not mean that the mental processes of a civilized individual are, psychologically considered, the more logical. When confronted with a new phenomenon, civilized and uncivilized man alike synthesize it with the body of knowledge handed down to each respectively. That traditional knowledge may be rationalistic and systematized in the former case and quite crude in the other, but the individual mental attitude is identical. Thus we might say in accordance with Boas' view of the subject that those who nowadays imbibe an evolutionary theory without even thinking of a critical investigation of the facts stand toward their doctrine in exactly the same psychological relation as the old-time believers to their religious creeds or as uncivilized man toward his mythological conceptions.

The association of logically disparate activities forms one of the most striking features of primitive life. While we are accustomed to view only the main objects of acts and thoughts, primitive man tends to associate these with religious or symbolic ideas, investing them with a higher emotional significance than we are disposed to do. Nevertheless, emotional associations are not absent from our civilization, and our own customs in large measure share the character of primitive taboos, which best exemplify the form of association mentioned. Etiquette is sometimes, as in the case of modesty of dress, linked with morality, and religious persecution in European history is intelligible only from the association of ethical with religious ideas. Custom involves a strong emotional reaction against breaches of the customary rules. When the existence of a definite mode of action rises into the consciousness of the actors, explanations of the customs are given that do not represent their real historical development. "We often hear that it is improper to eat with a knife because it might cut the mouth; but I doubt very much if this consideration has anything to do with the development of the custom, for the older type of sharp steel forks might as easily hurt the mouth as the blade of the knife" (p. 214). We must guard against accepting such rationalistic secondary interpretations as historical; it is quite possible that the custom has in the course of its existence been associated with different groups of ideas, and in such a case the rationalistic explanation will account for the later rather than the primary association. These considerations apply with equal force to primitive and higher cultures. Various instances cited show that while some customs may have originated from conscious reasoning many others must be supposed to have been developed without such reasoning (p. 228). Finally, Boas describes certain primitive types of

association that have no strong emotional basis: the association of folk-tales with cosmic phenomena, of symbolic interpretations with decorative designs, of social rules (e.g., exogamy) with religious concepts in totemism.

The general conclusion from the comparison of primitive and civilized traits is that in the field of action the force of tradition is nearly as strong among ourselves as in lower cultures, though with us the body of tradition has been largely purged of irrational elements. In the field of thought civilization involves a decrease of the emotional associations accompanied by a lessening of conservatism, and the elimination of logically heterogeneous associations.

Here a question of some sociological interest may be raised. While admitting the loss of associations in certain directions, can we not indicate the prolific development of other associations hardly less peculiar than those in primitive totemism or art symbolism? English literature, for example, has in general been characterized by an adherence of ethical to artistic ideals, yet the example of French literature shows that there is no necessary bond between morality and art. In the modern music drama logically heterogeneous elements have been successfully united against the protests of conservative rationalizing critics who would have kept them asunder. In Continental socialism we have a union of certain economic principles and political aspirations with a logically quite irrelevant opposition to religion. Still less obvious from a logical point of view is the championship by Socialists of Morgan's anthropological theories. In Austria the study of law is associated with a university degree, while from the English point of view legal practice and academic study are disparate phenomena. The gymnasium curriculum prescribed in Germany and Austria for future physicians has nothing to commend it from a utilitarian or rationalistic point of view; for what could be farther apart than the humanities and medicine? It is quite true that in several of the instances quoted there is at least a tendency to divorce the heterogeneous constituents. There is a demand, for example, that art shall exist for art's sake, that socialism shall not interfere with religion, that the medical curriculum shall be rationalized. But no such dissociative process can be traced in the case of modern opera. The notion that marriages shall be performed by civil or religious authority also involves a union of concepts often absent in primitive life and certainly not founded in logic. Further, the very complexity of our present culture seems to favor the combination of heterogeneous elements. An element has a certain "fringe" associated with it, not by

logical similarity but from some historical causes. When brought into relation with some other element, the latter now becomes associated in a secondary way with the same fringe. It is customary to serve refreshments at social gatherings. Then, if a group of men gather for the discussion of some scientific or philosophic problem, a collation is likely to be offered. A perfectly objective account by some Martian visitor of a scientific meeting or congress would probably reveal a considerable number of quite irrelevant constituents brought into association.

The final chapter deals with race problems in the United States. Part of its tenor has already been referred to. The author does not hold any dogmatic views as to the results of intermixture of Americans with Europeans of other than northern type and with Negroes. He is needs content with refuting the popular misconceptions as to the dangers connected with such intermixture, and demands an unprejudiced investigation of the problems involved. The point, that, while white men sometimes wed Negro women and thus cause an infusion of white blood into the Negro race, there is no corresponding infusion of Negro blood into the white race, is especially significant.

It is a matter of regret that so many subjects each of which would well merit distinct treatment have had to be crowded within the compass of one small volume. This is to the detriment not only of the specialist, but of the lay reader as well. Thus, the brief reference to the relation of pottery and basketry (p. 185) cannot possibly make the impression it deserves upon the uninitiated in the absence of concrete illustrations. In the interests of all readers it may be hoped that Professor Boas will soon expand this "briefer course" to three- or fourfold dimensions and create a work that will do for anthropology what James's *Principles of Psychology* has done for a kindred science.

ROBERT H. LOWIE

The Income Tax, a Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad. By EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN. New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. xi+711. (Bibliography, pp. 677-700.)

No book that comes from the hand of Professor Seligman can be overlooked by the student of general sociology, however far his specific interests may lie from the field of public finance, without risk of loss. The book at hand does full honor to the high standard of historical scholarship, keen logic, and acute insight into the exigencies of practical